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Introduction 2
 a) To provide a brief historical overview of the 
conflict. 
 b) To trace transformations whereby refugees 
became citizens on “borrowed” territory. 
 c) To argue that the unequal relationship that 
characterizes the relationship between “beneficiary” 
and “recipient” of aid is challenged in the Sahrawi 
case. 
Introduction 3
 Two factors facilitated self-government in the Sahrawi 
camps:
 1. The policies of the host-state – Algeria.
 2. The presence of political leadership with a vision to 
build a new society. 
 The Sahrawi case inspired the work of Barbara Harrell-
Bond and her critique of the humanitarian regime. 
Historical Overview 4
 Western Sahara lies on the northwest corner of Africa. 
 Rich in phosphate, minerals and fisheries.
 Possibly oil and natural gas.
 The people of Western Sahara are a mix of Arab tribes 
from Yemen (Bani Hassan), Berbers and sub-Saharan 
Africans.
 Speak Hassaniyyah a dialect of Arabic.  
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 The everyday life of the individual revolved around 
the freeg – a small bedouin camp of around five 
khaymas or tents/families.
 Pastoral nomads (camels, goats)
 Cultivation
 Trade
 Oral tradition. 
Oral historian 7
Poet and oral historian 8
Historical Overview 9
 Politically, the various Sahrawi tribes were 
represented by Ait Arb’een or the Assembly of Forty. 
 During the scramble of Africa in 1884 and 1885 
Western Sahara became a Spanish protectorate. 
 The genesis of contemporary Sahrawi national 
consciousness may be traced to the latter half of the 
twentieth century. 
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 The Polisario, the Sahrawi national liberation front, 
was formed  on the 10th of May 1973 
 The Spanish finally withdrew their soldiers in 
1975/76. 
 Instead of celebrating independence Morocco and 
Mauritania invaded the territory
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 Several times, beginning in the 1960s, the UN 
affirmed the right of Sahrawi self-determination.
 In May 1974, the UN sent a Mission of Inquiry which 
recommended a referendum. 
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 In December 1974, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) stated that .. the court has not found legal 
ties of such a nature as might affect the 
application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the 
decolonisation of Western Sahara and, in 
particular, of the principle of  self-
determination through the free and genuine 
expression of the will of the peoples of  the 
Territory.
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 The invasion led to a protracted war resulting in the 
displacement of approximately half the Sahrawi 
population. 
 In 1991 a cease-fire was declared and a UN mission 
(MINURSO) was deployed to oversee and facilitate 
the referendum. 
 The “referendum” has become like a desert mirage. 
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 Today, approximately a 1/3 of Western Sahara 
remains under the control of the Polisario.
 A “Wall of Shame” , 1,690 mile long barrier 
separates the “inside” from the “outside”. 
 The wall tore families and communities apart.
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“nation-state” 17
 The refugee camps in Lehmada  near Tindouf a small 
military town in the southwest corner of Algeria. 
 The camps are in a harsh and uninhabitable desert. 
 During the war  (1975-1976) most of the men were at 
the front . Women managed the camps with very 
meagre resources. 
Camp
From refugees to citizens of a modern 
“nation-state”
 On the 27th of February 1976, the Polisario declared 
the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR) – a state-in-exile .
 SADR’s aims: to liberate Western Sahara  and build 
a new society based on modern conceptions of 
citizenship. 
 It reinforced national belonging and worked to erase 
tribal allegiances. 
2002 celebrating the founding of the Polisario 20
From refugees to citizens of a modern 
“nation-state” 21
 This transformation was enacted through a Program 
of National Action.
 Polisario/SADR took over functions previously 
carried by the nodamic freeg (families, camp, group).
 Camps became incubators or the virtual territory to 
build a nation-state that could function as such upon 
repatriation to Western Sahara. 
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 Camps were administered as the territory of a 
sovereign nation-state. 
 Each camps is a wilaya or province, divided into 
dawa’er or districts and then  ahya’ municipalities, 
all named after urban centers in Western Sahara. 
 Collective mobilization at its highest during the war 
years. 
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 Neighbourhoods mirrored the freeg if not in its 
economic and ideological basis, in spatial 
arrangements and social relationships based on 
cooperation. 
 Sahrawis also invoke al-hasra the term that was 
used by tribes, when all gathered to fight against an 
external aggressor. 
 Popular participation, local and popular committees 
represented at the highest levels.
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 Education: mandatory for males and females.
 SADR’s role does not end when students graduate from 
elementary camp schools.
 It sends guides (mushrifin) with the younger students, 
who subsitute for coach, parent, etc. 
 Students abroad forge a substitute family that transcends 
tribal and kinship boundaries and enhances a collective 
Sahrawi identity.  
Grade six – in camps 27
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 Education was vital not only to reinforce national 
consciousness, but also to develop as rapidly as 
possible its human resources.
 The Sahrawi leadership had prematurely hoped or 
believed that the referendum would be taking place 
in a short period of time.
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 The Polisario and SADR introduced a Sahrawi 
historical and cultural narrative in the curriculum. 
 All nationalisms ‘invent’ or ‘reinvent’ tradition.
 A coherent narrative of the past was important to 
counter Moroccan claims that the people of Western 
Sahara are not a “nation”.  
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 The Returning Students: Upon their return to the 
camps, students volunteer. There is no formal 
economy or salaried jobs. 
 Many educated youths have nothing to do. 
 Neither SADR nor the refugees had expected their 
exile to last that long. 
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 Why do students return to the camps? 
 To abandon elders in the harsh desert and in poverty 
brings shame to the person. 
 A sense of responsibility to the refugees at large and 
the national cause. 
 Practical considerations: host states subsidizing their 
education do not permit them to remain; visa issues.
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 However, today more Sahrawis have been seeking to 
leave the camps.
 Purpose of migration: to improve their socioeconomic 
status and send remittances to their families in the 
camps. 
 Sahrawi refugee-migrants almost always see their status 
in countries like Spain, as temporary.
 Characterized by a high level of mobility in the region. 
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 The Program of National Action induced 
transformations in other areas, such as in the field of 
jurisdiction and health. 
 However, the Polisario do not dismiss “traditional” 
medicine, but local approaches to health coexist with 
the “modern”.
Traditional medicines exhibited during national 
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Donors and Recipients 35
 The Polisario took the lead in organizing camps long 
before thousands of humanitarian agencies and 
representatives descended on the camps. 
 Organizations like the UNHCR were unable to map the 
camps as humanitarian spaces. 
 Local Sahrawi committees distribute ration.
 The Polisario is politically sovereign, but economically 
dependent acts as buffer and mediator. 
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 SADR requires that all visitors or aid representatives 
to “check in” and get permission from the 
appropriate ministry or department.
 This process underscores the political identity of the 
refugees and their agency. 
 International aid practitioners and representatives 
working with refugees are not used to such a 
relationship.
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 It also ruffles their moral sensibility emanating from 
an attitude of charity: 
 NGO rep: “They are the refugees and they make us 
feel like we are”. 
 Sahrawis maintain that SADR is the legitimate 
representative: any program originating from 
outside its area of sovereignty must pass through the 
appropriate governmental channels. 
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 The debate over Vacaciones en Paz.
 Spanish families ‘adopt’ a Sahrawi child to spend the 
summer months with them. 
 Thousands of children between the ages of 8 – 13 
leave the camps and live with families in the various 
provinces of Spain. 
Getting ready: Vacaciones en Paz 40
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 For Sahrawis the program has four objectives: 
 1. Learning experience (Spanish and outside world).
 2. Health: keeps them away during the merciless desert 
heat in the summer months and allows them to get a 
medical heck-up. 
 3. Sahrawi children as “ambassadors” of the Sahrawi 
cause. 
 4. Economic benefit, the program is a source of material 
support for many families. 
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 Each child returns to his or her family from Spain with parcels 
containing presents, and since the 1990s  bring back money. 
 Spanish NGO representatives and some scholars criticize the 
program:
 It is unfair to expose children to the world of comfort in Europe, 
knowing they will return to the harsh conditions in the refugee camps. 
 The program generates differentiation – some children bring back more 
than others. 
 Many express shock and discomfort: children and families have become 
‘bold’ and sometimes ask for specific items and for money.
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• They propose that gifts and money reinforce dependency.
• Some even question the ‘morality’ behind such a program, and 
whether children are being instrumentalised in the political 
struggle. 
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 Children are not passive victims of adult 
manipulation.
 They are not apolitical. Their participation is because 
they are part of their communities.
 War or displacement do not exclude children, and 
they become rapidly politicized and aware of the 
consequences of oppression on their families and 
communities. 
Donors and Recipients 45
 The underlying assumption: Beggars can’t be choosers, 
or can they?
 Aid organizations catering to refugees are established on 
ideological and structural frameworks that reinforce 
their role as donors, distributors, managers and 
‘moralists.’ 
 Refugee participation destabilizes the unequal 
relationship and challenges the ideological and ethical 
premises upon which they are based. 
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 The notion that Sahrawi refugees should not be sent to the land of 
plenty with its materialistic lure, only to send them back to face the 
barren desert camps, my research shows the contrary. 
 Sahrawi children are eager to return to their families and the camps. 
They miss the autonomy and spatial freedom they enjoy in the 
camps.
 Children move in and out of huts and tents where they converse, 
sleep and eat with different generations.
 In Spanish society, generally, the boundaries between children, 
adults and the outer space is more clearly demarcated.  
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 Although by no means an ideal society, the Sahrawi 
refugee camps do in fact provide us with a model 
that shows that one may indeed receive a gift, but if 
the gift is not beneficial or even desirable, one can 
place constraints on both the gift giver and the gift, 
and be able to reciprocate the gift.
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 The ability of the Sahrawis to freely organize and 
build a new society in the camps, hinged:
 Foremost on the full support of the Algerian host-state, and
 on the presence of political leadership with a strategic vision 
for the future and an ‘action plan’. 
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 A unique relationship between the host state and a 
national liberation movement based on its territory.
 Algeria granted the Sahrawis a piece of land, upon 
which they could establish a sovereign state. 
 SADR issues a Sahrawi passport, symbolically it 
reinforces the idea of sovereignty. 
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 Sahrawi passports, nonetheless, concurrently expose 
the vulnerability of a territoria-less or 
deterritorialized state. 
 To travel outside Algeria, an Algerian or other 
passport is needed.
 However, the Sahrawi-Algerian passport acts more 
like a travel document or laissez passé and does not 
fulfill the Algerian civil status, or citizenship 
requirements.  
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 In the area where the camps are established, Sahrawi and 
not Algerian laws apply, although the land is Algerian. 
 If there is a crime committed in the camps, Sahrawi laws 
and procedures apply.
 In the camps Sahrawis feel they are living in a Sahrawi 
society.  
 The “borrowed” land area is where sovereignty is 
embodied or embedded.
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 The government makes its decisions as a sovereign 
state. 
 Algerians visiting the camps need permission as if 
they are crossing state boundaries into the Sahrawi 
Republic symbolized by national flags and 
checkpoints. 
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 This state of affairs, allowed the Sahrawis to 
experience what citizenship in their own state is like 
in concrete terms.  It also enabled a sense of self-
achievement in a sovereign entity. 
 New traditions of citizenship developed, interacting 
and dealing with governmental and social 
administrative bodies and institutions. 
 Citizenship  is learned in the course of everyday life. 
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 In 1991 when the cease fire was declared refugees 
began packing their suitcases to leave lehmada.
 Until today all peace efforts failed.
 SADR does not have the means to meet the needs of 
a growing population.
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 Since the 1991 cease-fire, the informal market grew 
exponentially, and inequalities have sharpened, 
inciting criticism of the leadership.
 During my recent visit, I noted that television sets, 
mobile phones, and second-hand vehicles were 
everywhere, harbingers of what Sahrawis call, 
usually as a cynical remark, “perestroika.” 
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 The war years now take on the glow of a golden age, 
a time of communal sharing  and a tight collective 
ethos. 
 The Polisario adapted to these changes by relaxing 
some of the policies it had strictly imposed and by 
allowing the informal economy to grow in order to 
help ease the economic strain. 
 Meanwhile, a new, educated, and unemployed 
generation is growing restless;
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 Many wish for the return of war as a more viable solution than 
slow death while waiting in the camps. 
 Others seek to emigrate, or have left school to start a small 
mercantile enterprise. 
 Carrying mobile phones and listening to Algerian rai music 
while riding in a four wheel drive between camps, is a sign 
that global markets have long reached the desert camps.
 But Sahrawis see a positive side: they use the internet and 
mobile phones to spread the news about their struggle, and to 
talk to one another across walls and camps. 
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 The internet and cell phones have been crucial in 
getting news out of Morocco where the Sahrawi 
intifada and Moroccan repression is concealed from 
mainstream media.
 But this is not what the older generation of stoic 
cadres had imagined for  their children. They call 
them jeel al-infitah,  or “the generation of openness.” 
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 However, the Polisario is not too worried, refugees 
who have focused on improving their lives in the 
camps are less likely to compromise politically, as 
Mundy opined. 
 Younger generations of  Sahrawis have come to 
differentiate between their efforts to improve their 
livelihood and their firm political stances .
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 The challenge of reconciling the needs of a growing 
refugee population with collective political 
mobilization in the context of the current stalemate 
remains. 
 But the Polisario succeeded in transforming camps 
into preparatory social and political spaces to 
generate changes in the present so as to achieve 
liberation and repatriation in the future. 
